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Abstract
We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which
of two alternatives is better for them. Voters can acquire some costly
information about the alternatives. In agreement with Downs’s ratio-
nal ignorance hypothesis, as the number of voters increases, individual
investment in political information declines to zero. However, if the
marginal cost of information acquisition approaches zero as the in-
formation acquired becomes nearly irrelevant, there is a sequence of
equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to correspond to
the interests of the majority. Under certain conditions, the election
outcome corresponds to the interests of the majority with probability
approaching one. Thus, “rationally ignorant” voters are consistent
with a well-informed electorate. JEL D72, D82.
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support.1 Introduction
One of the most inﬂuential contributions of Anthony Downs’s An Economic
Theory of Democracy to the economic modelling of politics is the concept
of “rational ignorance.” Given that each individual voter has a negligible
probability of aﬀecting the outcome in a large election, voters will not have
an incentive to acquire political information before voting. In a situation in
which discovering their interests or “true views” takes time and eﬀort from
individual citizens, the result may be a failure of democracy to produce a
result consistent with the interests of the majority. In Downs’s words,
If all others express their true views, he [the voter] gets the ben-
eﬁt of a well-informed electorate no matter how well-informed he
is; if they are badly informed, he cannot produce those beneﬁts
himself. Therefore, as in all cases of individual beneﬁts, the in-
dividual is motivated to shirk his share of the costs: he refuses
to get enough information to discover his true views. Since all
men do this, the election does not reﬂect the true consent of the
governed. (Downs 1957, p. 246)
We can actually draw a distinction between two versions of the rational
ignorance hypothesis. The “weak version” is that individual voters, realizing
that each vote has a negligible probability of aﬀecting the outcome of the
election, invest very little or no eﬀort in acquiring political information. The
“strong version” is that the election outcome itself will not be more likely to
reﬂect the interests of the majority than, say, a fair coin toss. In this paper,
we develop a formal model that is consistent with the weak version of the
rational ignorance hypothesis, but contradicts the strong version.
A good deal of the literature on the inﬂuence activities of interest groups
assumes that a decisive fraction of the electorate is uninformed because indi-
vidual voters have little incentive to get political information (see e.g. Becker
1983 for an explicit discussion). Becker (1985) argues that eﬃciency may be
restored in the voting market because of the activity of inﬂuence groups.
Coate and Morris (1995) point out that the reelection motive may induce
incumbent politicians to behave eﬃciently unless voters are uncertain about
politicians’ types. (In their view, and Becker’s, eﬃciency does not mean that
1transfers from the majority to interest groups do not occur; it only means
that those transfers are carried out with minimum dead weight costs.) Closer
to our point, Wittman (1989) calls into question the idea that the costs of
information fall on the voter instead of on political entrepreneurs.
We provide a diﬀerent rationale for elections to reﬂect the interests of the
majority. In our model, there are no interest groups or active politicians.
Voters do not have access to free information. Instead, they may acquire
some information, at a cost. Crucially, acquiring poor information is cheap.
We show that, as the number of voters increases, voters acquire less and
less information. However, there is an equilibrium sequence such that along
the sequence the outcome of the election is very likely to correspond to the
interests of a majority of voters. Thus, the electorate may be quite well-
informed even if individual voters are (at least asymptotically) rationally
ignorant.
We study an election in which voters have common preferences, but they
do not know which of two alternatives is better for them. Voters may acquire
a costly signal about the alternatives. The signal is correct with probability
1/2 + x, where x is chosen by the voter. We refer to x as the quality of the
signal. The cost of acquiring the signal is given by some convex function
C(x). Our ﬁrst three theorems describe information acquisition and aggre-
gation under the assumption that voters would be indiﬀerent between the
alternatives if they were to decide solely on the basis of their prior beliefs.
Theorem 1 shows that, if C0(0) = 0, then there is an equilibrium in which
the quality of information acquired by voters is positive for an arbitrarily
large electorate. In agreement with the weak version of the rational ignorance
hypothesis, individual investment in information approaches zero as the size
of the electorate increases.
Theorem 2 provides an estimate of the limit probability of choosing the
best alternative along the sequence of equilibria in which voters acquire some
information. If C00(0) < ∞, this probability is strictly larger than 1/2. More-
over, this probability goes to one as C00(0) approaches zero, or as the impor-
tance attached by voters to the election grows unboundedly. If C00(0) = 0,
the limit probability of choosing the best alternative is actually one. Suc-
cessful information aggregation is possible because the information acquired
by each voter goes to zero but it does so slowly enough to allow the eﬀect of
2large numbers to kick in.
It is reasonable to believe that voters are involuntarily exposed to a ﬂow
of political information in the course of everyday activities – a point already
acknowledged by Downs (1957, p. 245), who relies on the unwillingness of
voters to assimilate even freely available information in order to support the
rational ignorance hypothesis. If the function C simply reﬂects the cost of
“paying a little attention,” the conditions for at least partially successful
information aggregation, that is C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) < ∞, do not appear
unduly restrictive.
Theorem 3 establishes that the aggregate cost of information acquisition
declines to zero as the number of voters increases if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0. If
C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) > 0, then the aggregate cost converges to a positive
constant. Combining Theorems 2 and 3, we obtain that the informative equi-
librium is asymptotically eﬃcient if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0. Moreover, universal
or near universal participation in elections is desirable in that case. However,
if C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) > 0, the informative equilibrium is not asymptotically
eﬃcient, and the optimal size of the electorate may be small in relation to
the size of the society.
Political information in our model is a public good. As in other instances
of privately provided public goods, there is an incentive to free ride on other
voters, and in fact voters underinvest in political information in relation to
a symmetric optimal proﬁle. In the traditional problem of private provision
of public goods in large economies (as described e.g. in Andreoni 1988), the
marginal cost of contributing is constant, and the contributions of others
reduce the marginal utility of additional units of the public good up to the
point where it does not compensate most agents to contribute. In our model,
the marginal cost is small for small contributions. The marginal beneﬁt of
contributing is positive because the probability of being pivotal is nonzero,
though it decreases with the number of voters. Opposite to what happens in
the traditional problem, approximate eﬃciency can be obtained in the limit.
Next, we relax the assumption that voters are ex ante indiﬀerent between
the alternatives. Theorem 4 shows that the previous results hold as long
as the asymmetry in prior beliefs and preferences is small or C00(0) is close
enough to zero. In equilibria with information acquisition, voters randomize
between acquiring information and voting according to the signal received, or
3acquiring no information and voting for the alternative favored ex ante. The
beliefs of voters, conditional on being decisive, are kept very close, so that
very little information can change the behavior of voters at the booth. This,
in turn, makes voters to be willing to acquire vanishingly little information.
Theorems 5 and 6, ﬁnally, deal with a situation in which voters’ pref-
erences are heterogeneous. In that case, the fraction of voters who acquire
information goes to zero as the size of the electorate increases. This is rem-
iniscent of the work by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). Feddersen and
Pesendorfer show that the fraction of “swing” voters who use their private
information in order to decide whom to vote for declines to zero in large
elections. Our model shows that the quality of information acquired by (in-
dividual) swing voters also declines to zero. However, the best alternative is
chosen with probability strictly larger than 1/2 as long as C0(0) = C00(0) = 0,
and with probability approaching one as long as C0(0) = C00(0) = C000(0) = 0.
These conditions are considerably more stringent than those that apply when
voters have common preferences. Intuitively, we are a step closer to the tradi-
tional problem of public good provision in that most voters do not contribute
to a better informed electorate.
Taken together, our results support the idea that elections serve the in-
terests of the majority better than what the rational ignorance hypothesis
would seem to indicate at ﬁrst glance, at least if swing voters have com-
mon preferences. They suggest that models of public opinion that take into
account the production of information by the media, interest groups, and
the like, can be enriched by considering the aggregate implications of voters
investing some small (but positive) eﬀort in costly information processing.
Our model is related to the literature on information aggregation in elec-
tions inspired by Condorcet’s jury theorem (e.g. Miller 1986, Austen-Smith
and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, McLennan 1998, Duggan
and Martinelli 2001). This literature typically assumes that there is some
information dispersed among the voters, while in our paper the distribution
of information arises endogenously through the actions of voters. As a con-
sequence, we obtain that larger electorates are beneﬁcial for society in some
circumstances, but not in others. (Lack of information aggregation in large
elections is obtained also by Yariv (2004) in a context in which private sig-
nals carry less information as the electorate grows, and by Razin (2003) in
4a context in which voters use their vote as a message to inﬂuence the policy
of the winning candidate.)
Recently, Mukhopadhaya (2003) and Persico (2004) have proposed other
models of endogenous information in collective decision making. In their
models, the quality of the signal is given; voters can either acquire or not
acquire information. As a consequence, in their models it is not possible to
have arbitrarily large numbers of voters acquiring arbitrarily poor informa-
tion. Persico, in particular, is concerned with the optimal design of commit-
tees, i.e. the optimal selection of committee size and voting rule in situations
in which large elections are ineﬃcient, while we concern ourselves with the
endogenous production and aggregation of information in situations in which
large elections may be asymptotically eﬃcient.
2 The Model
We analyze an election with two alternatives, A and B. There are 2n + 1
voters (i = 1,...,2n+1). A voter’s utility depends on the chosen alternative
d ∈ {A,B}, the state z ∈ {zA,zB}, and the quality of information acquired
by the voter before the election x ∈ [0,1/2]. Acquiring information of quality
x has a utility cost given by C(x), so the utility of a voter can be written as
U(d,z) − C(x).
At the beginning of time, nature selects the state. The prior probability
of state zA is qA ∈ (0,1) and the prior probability of state zB is qB = 1−qA.
Voters are uncertain about the realization of the state. After the realization
of the state, each voter must decide the quality of her information. After
deciding on x, the voter receives a signal s ∈ {sA,sB}. The probability of
receiving signal sA in state zA is equal to the probability of receiving signal
sB in state zB and is given by 1/2 + x. That is, the likelihood of receiving
the “right” signal is increasing in the quality of information acquired by the
voter; if the voter acquires no information the signal is uninformative. Signals
are private information.
The election takes place after voters receive their signals. A voter can
either vote for A or vote for B. (That is, there are no abstentions.) The
alternative with most votes is chosen.
5We assume
U(A,zA) − U(B,zA) = rA > 0 and U(B,zB) − U(A,zB) = rB > 0.
That is, A is the “right” alternative in state zA and B is the “right” alter-
native in state zB.
The cost function C is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable on (0,1/2). We assume that C(0) = 0, so that ac-
quiring no information is costless. Note that C0(0) ∈ [0,∞). If C00(x) grows
unboundedly as x goes to zero, we use the notation C00(0) = ∞. Thus,
C00(0) ∈ [0,∞]. We may prefer to think of the probability of receiving the
right signal as a function 1/2 + m(e) of some underlying “eﬀort level” by
the voter with utility cost Ψ(e). In that case, C is deﬁned as Ψ ◦ m−1. C
satisﬁes the assumptions of the model if m is concave and Ψ is convex (one
of them strictly so), and both are strictly increasing and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, with Ψ(0) = m(0) = 0. Moreover, C0(0) = 0 if Ψ0(0) = 0, and
C00(0) = 0 if Ψ00(0) = 0. Intuitively, the requirements on C are satisﬁed if
the marginal productivity of a voter’s eﬀort in the acquisition of information
is constant or diminishing, and the marginal cost of eﬀort is increasing.
After describing the environment, we turn now to the description of
strategies and the deﬁnition of equilibrium in the model. A pure strategy
is a triple (x,vA,vB), where x ∈ [0,1/2] speciﬁes a quality of information,
vA ∈ {A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving signal sA,
and vB ∈ {A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving signal
sB. A mixed strategy for voter i is a probability distribution αi over the set
of pure strategies.
A voting equilibrium α (αi = α for all i) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
An equilibrium is informative if the equilibrium distribution assigns positive
probability to the set of pure strategies with x > 0.
Obviously, there are at least two uninformative voting equilibria: for every
voter to adopt the pure strategy (0,A,A) with probability one, and for every
voter to adopt the pure strategy (0,B,B) with probability one. In either
case, the probability that a single voter is decisive is zero, so it is a best
response to acquire no information and vote for the alternative favored by
every other voter. In fact, as long as qArA 6= qBrB or C0(0) = 0, there is no
other uninformative equilibrium. If voters adopt any other mixed strategy
6without information acquisition, the probability that a single voter is decisive
is positive and the same in both states. But then, if, say, qArA > qBrB, the
pure strategy (0,A,A) has a higher payoﬀ than any other pure strategy with
x = 0. If, instead, qArA = qBrB and C0(0) = 0, it is a best response for
a voter to acquire some information with probability one. (See the proof
of Theorem 1.) We focus on informative equilibria in the remainder of the
paper.
3 Rational Ignorance
For the ease of presentation, from here to Section 5 we consider the case in
which qArA = qBrB, so that neither alternative is favored by prior beliefs and
preferences. The following theorem states that C0(0) = 0 is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the existence of an informative equilibrium in a large
election, and characterizes this equilibrium.
Theorem 1
(i) If C0(0) = 0 and qArA = qBrB, there is an informative equilibrium,
and it is unique within the class of informative equilibria. The informative







n qArA = C
0(x). (1)
(ii) If C0(0) > 0, there is some n such that for every n ≥ n (holding the other
parameters of the model constant) there is no informative equilibrium.
(The proof of this and other results in the paper is in the Appendix.) Intu-
itively, if a pure strategy with information acquisition is played with positive
probability in equilibrium, then it must equate the marginal cost with the
marginal beneﬁt of acquiring information. The marginal beneﬁt of acquiring
information, in turn, is equal to the sum of the probabilities of being deci-
sive, conditional on each state being realized, multiplied by the utility gain
in choosing the right alternative. A voter is decisive if n other voters vote for
A and n other voters vote for B. Since the probability of this event converges
uniformly to zero as the size of the electorate increases for any symmetric
7strategy proﬁle, it follows that there cannot be an informative equilibrium
for n large enough if C0(0) = 0. Therefore, C0(0) = 0 is a necessary condition
for the existence of informative equilibria in large elections.
To check that C0(0) = 0 is also suﬃcient whenever qArA = qBrB, con-
sider a symmetric strategy proﬁle in which every voter adopts a pure strat-
egy (x,A,B) (with x > 0) with probability one. Equation (1) equates the
marginal beneﬁt with the marginal cost of acquiring information for that
strategy proﬁle. In particular, the probability of being decisive for that pro-










As explained in the proof, the other equilibrium requirement is that the in-
formative pure strategy played with positive probability in equilibrium must
have a higher or equal payoﬀ than the pure strategies of acquiring no infor-
mation and voting for a ﬁxed alternative. This requirement is easily veriﬁed
if qArA = qBrB.
Let xn represent the value of x∗ for a given n. Since the left-hand side
of equation (1) converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity for any sequence of
x ∈ [0,1/2], xn converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Note that in the
informative equilibrium the probability of reaching the right decision is the






(1/2 + xn)m(1/2 − xn)2n+1−m.
Though xn goes to zero, this probability may not go to 1/2 since the number
of terms in the summation increases with n. That is, the strong version of
the rational ignorance hypothesis may fail even if the weak version holds, as
suggested by the examples below.
Consider this quadratic example: C(x) = 5x2 and qArA = qBrB = 1/2.
The second column of Table 1 gives us the values of xn for diﬀerent elec-
torate sizes (2n+1), including the case of a single decision-maker. The third
column gives us the probability of reaching the right decision. Though this
probability decreases with n, it seems to converge to 0.56262. The aggregate
cost of information acquisition ((2n + 1)C(xn)) also decreases with n and it
seems to converge around 0.031.
8Table 1: The Quadratic Example
C(x) = 5x2; qArA = qBrB = 1/2
Electorate Information Probability of Aggregate
size quality right decision cost
1 0.10000 0.60000 0.05000
11 0.02432 0.56558 0.03253
101 0.00786 0.56293 0.03121
1001 0.00249 0.56265 0.03107
10001 0.00079 0.56262 0.03105
100001 0.00025 0.56262 0.03105
Table 2: The Cubic Example
C(x) = 331
3x3; qArA = qBrB = 1/2
Electorate Information Probability of Aggregate
size quality right decision cost
1 0.10000 0.60000 0.03333
11 0.04845 0.62913 0.04170
101 0.02632 0.70220 0.06139
1001 0.01330 0.80018 0.07859
10001 0.00613 0.89002 0.07688
100001 0.00258 0.94868 0.05729
Now consider this cubic example: C(x) = 331
3x3 and qArA = qBrB = 1/2,
illustrated by Table 2. In contrast with the previous example, the probabil-
ity of reaching the right decision seems to approach one. Though initially
increasing, the aggregate cost is eventually decreasing in the electorate size.
The next section reveals that these examples are, in fact, representative of
general results.
4 Informative Equilibria in Large Elections
In this section we analyze the limiting properties of the sequence of informa-
tive equilibria obtained by increasing the size of the electorate.
94.1 Information Aggregation
We investigate here the limit probability of reaching the right decision. If





2k)qArA = kc. (2)
(We use φ to denote the standard normal density and Φ to denote the stan-
dard normal distribution function.) Note that k is strictly decreasing in c
and grows unboundedly as c goes to zero. We deﬁne k = ∞ if C00(0) = 0
and k = 0 if C00(0) = ∞. As we will see below, k is an indicator of the
information held by the electorate in large elections. We have
Theorem 2 Assume C0(0) = 0 and qArA = qBrB. Along the sequence of in-
formative equilibria, the probability of choosing the right alternative converges
to Φ(2
√
2k). In particular, it converges to one if C00(0) = 0.
The ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 2 establishes that n1/2xn goes
to k as n goes to inﬁnity. To provide an intuition, we can obtain from
equation (1), using a Taylor approximation in the right-hand side and a
















Using an approximation (for large n and ﬁxed n1/2xn) for the term in brackets







If C00(0) = 0, this expression cannot hold unless n1/2xn goes to +∞; otherwise
the right-hand side goes to zero and the left-hand side remains bounded away
from zero. If C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞), k ∈ (0,∞) can be obtained directly from
the expression above.
With respect to the rest of the proof, note that a voter votes for the right
alternative with probability equal to 1/2 + xn. Thus, the expected number
10of votes for the right alternative of (2n + 1)(1/2 + xn) and the variance is
(2n + 1)(1/4 − x2
n). A normal approximation to the probability of the right
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Taking limits, we get Φ(2
√
2k). A “naive” application of the central limit
theorem as described is not really appropriate because the distribution repre-
senting the decision of a given voter changes with the electorate size. Instead,
we use a normal approximation result for ﬁnite samples, the Berry-Esseen
theorem.
We can interpret equation (2) as a “ﬁrst order condition” at inﬁnity if
C0(0) = 0, C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞) and qArA = qBrB. To see this, if every voter
acquires some information, the expected utility of voter i (up to a positive










where x is the average quality acquired by the 2n + 1 voters and xi the
information quality acquired by voter i. Maximizing this expression with
respect to xi we get
2(2n + 1)
−1/2 φ(2(2n + 1)
1/2x)(2qArA) = xic,






Equation (2) follows from k ≈ n1/2xi = n1/2x.
To illustrate Theorem 2, note that for the quadratic example we can
calculate k as 0.055723. In fact, in this example 50001/2x5000 = 0.055721
and 500001/2x50000 = 0.055723. Moreover, the limit probability of society
making the right decision is 0.56262. Thus, Theorem 2 provides an excellent
approximation for the quadratic example with 10,000 voters or more. For
the cubic example, k = +∞, and the limit probability of society making the
right decision is one. With 100,000 voters we are still some way oﬀ the limit.
11A result related to Theorem 2 is that elections with information acquisi-
tion will tend to be very close. Deﬁne the winning margin to be a random
variable representing the diﬀerence between the number of votes for the win-
ner and the number of votes for the loser, divided by 2n + 1. We have
Proposition 1 Assume C0(0) = 0 and qArA = qBrB. For any κ > 0, the
probability that the winning margin is larger than κ converges to zero along
the sequence of informative equilibria as the size of the electorate increases.
Intuitively, the mean of the distribution of the percentage of votes for the
right alternative is 1/2+xn, which converges to 1/2 from above. If C00(0) = 0,
however, the distribution of the percentage of votes for the right alternative
concentrates very fast around its central terms as n goes to inﬁnity, so that
the probability that this percentage is larger than 1/2 goes to one.
4.2 The Cost of Information
We turn now to the cost of information acquisition in large elections. The
following theorem gives us an estimate of the aggregate cost of information
acquisition ((2n + 1)C(xn)) in large elections.
Theorem 3 Assume C0(0) = 0 and qArA = qBrB. If C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞),
then the aggregate cost converges to ck2 along the sequence of informative
equilibria as the size of the electorate increases. If either C00(0) = 0 or
C00(0) = ∞, the aggregate cost converges to zero.
To see this, note that
lim






If C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞), the statement of the theorem follows from n1/2xn → k
(from the proof of Theorem 2) and C(xn)/x2
n → c/2 (by L’Hˆ opital’s rule).





It is simple to check that z → 0 if either c → 0 or c → +∞. This shows
that the aggregate cost of information is near 0 in a large election if C00(0) is
12very small or very large. An argument in the Appendix (similar to the proof
of Theorem 2) shows that in fact the aggregate cost converges to 0 if either
C00(0) = 0 or C00(0) = ∞.
To illustrate this result, in the quadratic example we can compute ck2 =
0.03105, so that we have an excellent approximation with 10,000 voters or
more. In the cubic example, the aggregate cost should go to zero; with
100,000 voters we are still some way oﬀ.
5 Eﬃciency and Design
In this section we deal with normative issues such as the asymptotic eﬃciency
of informative equilibria and the optimal size of the electorate.
5.1 Eﬃciency of Large Elections
In this section we investigate whether the informative equilibrium is eﬃcient
in the limit. For any (symmetric or asymmetric) strategy proﬁle αn, the
utilitarian social welfare is, up to a positive aﬃne transformation,
V
αn = (2n + 1)(P
αn
A qArA + P
αn





d is the probability of choosing alternative d in state zd under the
strategy proﬁle αn, and C
αn
T is the total expected cost invested in information
acquisition by society members. Note that V αn ≤ (2n + 1)(qArA + qBrB).
Let α∗
n be the informative equilibrium proﬁle. We say that the informative
equilibrium is asymptotically eﬃcient if for every ε > 0 there is some ﬁnite




αn ≥ 1 − ε
for all strategy proﬁles αn = (α1,...,α2n+1).
From Theorems 2 and 3, we know that along the sequence of informative
equilibria the probability of choosing the right alternative converges to one
and the aggregate cost converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity if C0(0) =
C00(0) = 0 and qArA = qBrB. Thus, under those conditions, V α∗
n/[(2n +
1)(2qArA)] → 1, so the informative equilibrium is asymptotically eﬃcient.
13If C00(0) > 0, however, the informative equilibrium is not asymptotically
eﬃcient. To see this, note that
V
α∗




n represent the optimal symmetric proﬁle. We have
Proposition 2 If C0(0) = 0, C00(0) < ∞, and qArA = qBrB,
V
αo
n/[(2n + 1)(2qArA)] → 1.
The proof is similar to those of Theorems 2 and 3, and establishes that
the probability of choosing the right alternative converges to one, and the
average cost (as opposed to the aggregate cost) converges to zero, along the
sequence of optimal symmetric proﬁles. The asymptotic ineﬃciency of the
informative equilibrium follows from the proposition if 0 < C00(0) < ∞.
If C00(0) = ∞, we can compare the informative equilibrium proﬁle with
the asymmetric proﬁle in which only the ﬁrst voter is asked to acquire some
positive amount of information ρ and vote according to the signal received,
while n voters vote for A and n voters vote for B regardless of the signal.
The ratio of social welfare under the informative equilibrium proﬁle to social
welfare under the asymmetric proﬁle described converges to (1/2)/(1/2+ρ) <
1. Thus, the informative equilibrium is asymptotically ineﬃcient if C00(0) =
∞. Of course, a similar argument shows that uninformative equilibria are
never asymptotically eﬃcient.
For instance, consider the quadratic example. Social welfare in the in-
formative equilibrium with 100,001 voters is given by 56,263. The optimal
strategy proﬁle would prescribe xo
50000 around 0.007, which yields a social
welfare of 99,976. Now consider the cubic example. Social welfare in the in-
formative equilibrium is given by 94,869. The optimal strategy proﬁle would
prescribe xo
50000 around 0.008 which yields a social welfare of 99,999, very close
to the upper bound, 100,001. Both in the quadratic and the cubic example,
any uninformative equilibrium would yield a social welfare of 50,000.5.
5.2 The Optimal Size of the Electorate
Consider a society with N members, where N is an odd number. If the society
gets to choose the size of the electorate 1 ≤ 2n + 1 ≤ N, anticipating that
14the voters will play the informative equilibrium, what would be the optimal
choice? We now let n = 0 represent the choice of a single decision-maker.
Since per capita social welfare converges to its upper bound qArA +qBrB
as the size of the electorate increases whenever C0(0) = C00(0) = 0 and
qArA = qBrB, it follows that under those conditions for a large society the
optimal size of the electorate is either the size of the society or near it. That
is, universal suﬀrage is at least nearly optimal. Moreover, under the (quite
mild) condition C0(1/2) > 2qArA, guaranteeing that a single decision-maker
would not acquire perfect information, social welfare under universal suﬀrage
is larger than under delegation to a small committee for a large society. In
the cubic example, for instance, a society with 100,001 members would ﬁnd
that social welfare is increasing in participation in elections.
Universal suﬀrage, however, is not necessarily nearly optimal if C0(0) = 0
and C00(0) > 0. In the quadratic example, for instance, a society with 100,001
members would be better oﬀ by delegating the decision on a single person




5x2 if x ≤ 0.02
−0.0008 + 0.12x − x2 + 100x3 if x ≥ 0.02,
then the society would be better oﬀ by delegating the decision on a committee




then the society would be better oﬀ by holding elections with universal suf-
frage. That is, by changing the shape of the cost function away from 0 we
can get any electorate size to be optimal.
Finally, if C0(0) > 0, universal suﬀrage cannot be optimal or nearly op-
timal in a large society as long as C0(0) < 2qArA; that is, as long as a
single-decision maker is willing to acquire some information. A suﬃcient
condition for a single-decision maker to be optimal in a large society is
qArA ≤ C0(0) < 2qArA; in this case the free-riding problem is so severe that
committee members would not acquire any information. If C0(0) < qArA,
then, as in the previous case, the optimal size of the electorate depends on
the shape of the cost function away from 0.
156 Robustness
In this section we show that our previous results hold under certain condi-
tions if prior beliefs and preferences are asymmetric. Relaxing the common
preference assumption of the model, however, is more problematic.
6.1 Asymmetric Preferences
In this section we relax the assumption that qArA = qBrB. As it turns out, if
C00(0) = 0 a (mixed strategy) informative equilibrium exists in large elections,
and perfect information aggregation and zero aggregate costs are obtained
in the limit regardless of any asymmetry in preferences (and prior beliefs).
However, if C00(0) > 0, an informative equilibrium in a large election exists
if and only if the asymmetry in preferences is moderate.
If qArA 6= qBrB, adopting with probability one the pure strategy that
equates the marginal beneﬁt and cost of acquiring information (as in Section
3) cannot be an equilibrium for n large enough. The reason is that for this
strategy proﬁle the beliefs of voters about the states conditional on being
decisive are equal to the prior beliefs. Thus, for information acquisition to
be worth it is necessary that
(qArA + qBrB)(1/2 + x) > max{qArA,qBrB}
– otherwise the posterior beliefs do not change enough to alter the optimal
decision of the voter at the ballot. However, the information acquired by each
voter must converge to zero as n increases. The solution to this diﬃculty
consists in allowing voters to randomize between the pure strategy of voting
for the alternative favored by preferences and the pure strategy of acquiring
information and voting according to the signal received. Under this mixed
strategy, beliefs about the states conditional on being decisive remain close
enough to make it worth acquiring vanishingly little information.
The diﬃculty alluded above when qArA 6= qBrB is a simple illustration of
a classic result by Radner and Stiglitz (1984) on the nonconcavity of the value
of information. Radner and Stiglitz show that it is unproﬁtable to acquire
“very little” information when there is a decision that is favored by prior
beliefs, and posterior beliefs and the payoﬀ from the corresponding optimal
decision vary continuously with the amount of information. In our setup,
16however, what matters for voters are not their prior beliefs over the states,
but their beliefs about the states conditional on being decisive. This gives
us a way around the nonconcavity of the value of information.










2(2k0 − h0))qBrB = k0c
(3.2) φ(
√
2(2k0 + h0))qArA = φ(
√
2(2k0 − h0))qBrB,
(3.3) k0 > |h0/2|,
if a solution exists. As shown in the Appendix, the system (3.1)-(3.3) has a
solution if qArA and qBrB are close enough or c is close enough to zero, and
the solution is unique. Moreover, if (ˆ k,ˆ h) exists, ˆ h > 0 iﬀ qArA > qBrB, and
ˆ h < 0 iﬀ qArA < qBrB. If C00(0) > 0 and qArA = qBrB, we let (ˆ k,ˆ h) = (k,0),
where k is as deﬁned in Section 4.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, if (ˆ k,ˆ h) exists and qArA > qBrB,
there is an informative equilibrium in large elections in which voters adopt the
pure strategy (0,A,A) with probability δn, and the pure strategy (ˆ xn,A,B)
with probability 1−δn. Moreover, n1/2ˆ xn converges to ˆ k, and n1/2δn converges
to ˆ h. (Similarly, if qArA < qBrB, the pure strategy (0,B,B) is adopted with
probability δn, and n1/2δn converges to −ˆ h.)
Theorem 4
(i) If C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, there is some n such that for every n ≥ n, there
is an informative equilibrium. Moreover, along a sequence of informative
equilibria, the probability of choosing the right alternative in either state con-
verges to one and the aggregate cost of information converges to zero.
(ii) If C0(0) = 0, C00(0) = c > 0, and (ˆ k,ˆ h) exists, there is some n such
that for every n ≥ n, there is an informative equilibrium. Moreover, along a
sequence of informative equilibria, the probability of choosing the right alter-
native converges to Φ(
√
2(2ˆ k+ˆ h)) in state zA and to Φ(
√
2(2ˆ k−ˆ h)) in state
zB, and the aggregate cost of information converges to cˆ k2.
(iii) If C00(0) = ∞, or if C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞) and there is no solution to the
system (3.1)−(3.2), there is some n such that for every n ≥ n, there is no
informative equilibrium.
As in Section 4.1, we can interpret equation (3.1) as a “ﬁrst-order con-
dition” at inﬁnity, equating the marginal beneﬁt with the marginal cost of
17information at the limit for a given voter. Equation (3.2) makes the voter
indiﬀerent in the limit between voting for A or voting for B, in the absence of
additional information coming from the signal. This is necessary to keep vot-
ers acquiring arbitrarily little information. The inequality (3.3) allows us to
show that if there is a “limit” equilibrium, given by a solution to (3.1)-(3.2),
then there is actually a voting equilibrium for large n.1
Though the informative equilibria described in case (ii) are asymptoti-
cally ineﬃcient, they yield a higher social welfare than any uninformative
equilibria. If, say, qArA > qBrB, this is the case in a large election if
Φ(
√
2(2ˆ k + ˆ h))qArA + Φ(
√
2(2ˆ k − ˆ h))qBrB > qArA
or, using (3.2) and symmetry of the normal distribution,
φ(−
√
2(2ˆ k + ˆ h))/Φ(−
√
2(2ˆ k + ˆ h)) > φ(
√
2(2ˆ k − ˆ h))/Φ(
√
2(2ˆ k − ˆ h)),
which is satisﬁed because the normal hazard rate is strictly decreasing.
Note that, when preferences are asymmetric, adopting a rule other than
simple majority may alleviate the need to randomize between acquiring or
not information. For instance, suppose that qArA > qBrB. If the voting rule
requires less than n + 1 votes to choose A, then the ratio of the probability
of being pivotal in state zA to the probability of being pivotal in state zB
would fall below 1/2 for any given symmetric pure strategy proﬁle (x,A,B).
It might even be possible to ﬁnd a qualiﬁed majority rule such that there
exists a pure strategy informative equilibrium. This is potentially important
if C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) > 0, as in this case informative equilibria under simple
majority are asymptotically ineﬃcient or may even fail to exist.
6.2 Heterogenous Preferences
In this section we modify the model to allow for heterogeneous preferences
among voters. In particular, we assume that, for each voter i, Ui(A,zA) = ui,
where ui is a random variable uniformly distributed over [0,1]. The remain-
ing preference parameters are given by Ui(B,zB) = 1 − ui and Ui(A,zB) =
Ui(B,zA) = 0. The random variables {ui} are independently distributed
1There is gap between the cases covered by (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 3, so that in prin-
ciple it may be possible to relax (3.3) and preserve existence of an informative equilibrium.
18(from each other, from the distribution of the state, and from the distribu-
tion of signals about the state). The utility of voter i can be written now as
Ui(d,z)−C(x). We keep the assumptions about the cost of information acqui-
sition from Section 2, and we add that C is thrice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Each voter decides how much information to acquire after learning privately
the realization of the preference parameter ui. As in Section 2, the election
takes place after voters receive their signals about the state z ∈ {zA,zB}.
For simplicity, we assume qA = qB = 1/2.
An action in the model with heterogenous preferences is deﬁned as a
triple (x,vA,vB), where x ∈ [0,1/2] speciﬁes a quality of information, vA ∈
{A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving signal sA, and
vB ∈ {A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving signal sB.
A strategy for voter i is now a (measurable) mapping
σi(ui) : [0,1] → [0,1/2] × {A,B} × {A,B},
specifying an action for every realization of the preference parameter ui. (For
simplicity, we omit considering strategies that allow for randomizing over
actions.) An equilibrium σ (σi = σ for all i) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
An equilibrium is informative if the equilibrium distribution over actions
(induced by the distribution of preferences and by the equilibrium mapping)
assigns positive probability to the set of actions with x > 0.
We have
Theorem 5 In the model with heterogeneous preferences, if C0(0) = 0, there
is an informative equilibrium, and it is unique (a.e.) within the class of in-





(0,B,B) if ui < 1/2 − ˜ xn + C(˜ xn)/C0(˜ xn)
(0,A,A) if ui > 1/2 + ˜ xn − C(˜ xn)/C0(˜ xn)
(˜ xn,A,B) otherwise,








Finally, if C0(0) > 0, there is some n such that for n ≥ n there is no
informative equilibrium.
19Intuitively, the probability of being decisive is too small for a voter with
a strong bias in favor of A or in favor of B to be willing to acquire any costly
information.
Since ˜ xn converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity, the fraction of voters
who acquire information (2˜ xn − 2C(˜ xn)/C0(˜ xn)) converges to zero. We may
wonder whether “good” information aggregation results are possible with
a vanishing fraction of voters acquiring vanishingly little information. The
answer to this question is yes, but under more restrictive conditions than in
the model with common preferences.





2˜ k) = (3/2)˜ k˜ c.
If C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, let ˜ k = ∞. If C00(0) = ∞, let ˜ k = 0. We have
Theorem 6 Assume C0(0) = 0. In the model with heterogeneous prefer-
ences, along the sequence of informative equilibria, the probability of choosing
the right alternative converges to Φ(2
√
2˜ k). In particular, it converges to one
if C00(0) = C000(0) = 0. Moreover, the expected aggregate cost of information
converges to ˜ c˜ k2/4 if C00(0) = 0 and C000(0) = ˜ c < ∞, and it converges to 0
otherwise.
The proof of Theorem 6 hinges on the fact that, with a large n, the
fraction of voters who acquire information is approximately 4˜ xn/3. Thus,
the probability of choosing the right alternative depends on 4˜ x2
nn1/2/3. The
limit of this expression is precisely ˜ k.
Theorems 5 and 6 are reminiscent of similar results by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997). In a model with free information and heterogeneous
preferences, they show that a vanishing fraction of voters takes into account
their private information when casting a vote. However, perfect information
aggregation is obtained in the limit. In our model, not only the fraction of
swing voters but also the information acquired by each swing voter goes to
zero. Thus, perfect information aggregation is obtained only under special
assumptions with respect to the cost function. If those assumptions fail, the
informative equilibrium is asymptotically ineﬃcient.
207 Final Remarks
In a setting in which acquiring political information is costly, we have shown
that the electorate as a whole may be much better informed than individ-
ual voters. In some circumstances, a result analogous to Condorcet’s jury
theorem is upheld: increasing the size of the electorate improves social wel-
fare even taking into account the voters’ costs. In some other circumstances,
though, Condorcet’s contention about the superiority of larger electorates
fails.
In the environment we study, a small deviation from rationality by voters
– ignoring completely the eﬀects of a single opinion – would have important
negative eﬀects on the responsiveness of collective decision making to the
interests of the majority. Akerlof (1989) has approached the issue of rational
ignorance from that perspective. However, deviations from strictly rational
beliefs may be as likely to occur in the direction of overestimating the im-
portance of a single opinion as in the direction of underestimating it. Voters
may derive some satisfaction from the belief that their vote counts for more
than it actually does, and overinvest in political information for that reason.
We have represented information acquisition by voters as a strictly in-
dividual endeavor. If voters can communicate their information to others
before the election, if diﬀerent voters have access to the same sources of
information, or if sources of information compete for subscribers, strategic
considerations will diﬀer from those in the current framework in nontrivial
ways. There is clearly a need for more formal research on the issue of endoge-
nous production and aggregation of information in large elections, perhaps
in connection with the recent interest in pre-election communication by pri-
vately informed voters (as in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002) or Gerardi
and Yariv (2003)), and our individualistic framework is meant as a ﬁrst step.
21Appendix
For any symmetric strategy proﬁle α and for any given voter, we deﬁne
Pα(piv|z) as the probability that n other voters vote for A and n other voters
vote for B in state z ∈ {zA,zB}. Pα(piv|z) represents the probability that
a single vote is pivotal (i.e. decisive) in state z. Letting pα(d|z) denote the
probability that a voter votes for alternative d in state z, as induced by the






Since pα(A|z)pα(B|z) is bounded above by 1/4, Pα(piv|z) is bounded above
by (2n)!/(22nn!n!), which converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Thus, the
probability of being decisive in either state converges uniformly to zero for
any sequence of symmetric strategy proﬁles as n goes to inﬁnity. We use this
fact throughout the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to show that, for any x > 0, the pure
strategies (x,A,A), (x,B,B), and (x,B,A) are strictly dominated. Thus,
for any pure strategy played in equilibrium with positive probability, x > 0
implies vA = A and vB = B.
Now, suppose that every voter other than i adopts the strategy α. Then,
the expected utility for voter i of adopting any pure strategy (xi,A,B) for
xi ≥ 0 is given by
Gα(xi) = [Pα(piv|zA)qArA + Pα(piv|zB)qBrB](1
2 + xi) − C(xi)
plus a term that does not depend on the action chosen by i. Note that this
expected utility is a strictly concave function of xi. Thus, it is maximized
by a unique choice of xi, say x0. It follows that a best-responding voter
plays at most one pure strategy with information acquisition with positive
probability, the pure strategy (x0,A,B). Moreover, the expected payoﬀ of
the pure strategy (0,A,B) is a convex combination of the expected payoﬀs
of (0,A,A) and (0,B,B). It follows that if x0 > 0, then (x0,A,B) has a
higher payoﬀ than either (0,A,A) or (0,B,B). Moreover, if the expected
payoﬀs of (0,A,A) and (0,B,B) are not equal, one of these pure strategies
has a higher payoﬀ than (0,A,B) and (0,B,A). Thus, if a best-responding
22voter plays an informative strategy, the support of this strategy is either (I)
{(x0,A,B)}, (II) {(x0,A,B),(0,A,A)}, or (III) {(x0,A,B),(0,B,B)}.
Since the term in brackets in the deﬁnition of Gα converges to zero for
any sequence of symmetric strategy proﬁles (and is independent of xi), x0
must be equal to 0 for n large enough if C0(0) > 0. This proves part (ii) of
the theorem.
Now consider a possible informative equilibrium strategy of type (I). Since
the term in brackets in Gα is equal to zero if every voter adopts the pure
strategy (1/2,A,B), it follows that the information acquired by every voter
satisﬁes 0 < x∗ < 1/2. Thus, the solution to the problem of maximizing
Gα(xi) is interior, so that x∗ must satisfy
Pα(piv|zA)qArA + Pα(piv|zB)qBrB = C
0(x
∗).















(1/4 − (x∗)2)n(qArA + qBrB) = C0(x∗).
Note that x∗ exists and is unique for every n as long as C0(0) = 0. Addition-
ally, the pure strategy (x∗,A,B) must yield a higher payoﬀ than the pure
strategies (0,A,A) and (0,B,B). That is,
Gα(x
∗) ≥ max{Pα(piv|zA)qArA,Pα(piv|zB)qBrB}.











This inequality is always satisﬁed for qArA = qBrB, so that if C0(0) = 0 and
qArA = qBrB there is a unique equilibrium of type (I) and it is as described
in part (i) of the theorem.
Consider a possible informative equilibrium strategy of type (II). Let δ
be the probability that (0,A,A) is played under the proposed strategy and
23let (x,A,B) the informative strategy that is played with probability (1−δ).




















(1/4 − (x − δ(1/2 + x))2)n.
The equilibrium conditions are
Pα(piv|zA)qArA + Pα(piv|zB)qBrB = C
0(x) (6)
(for n large enough) and
Gα(x) = Pα(piv|zA)qArA ≥ Pα(piv|zB)qBrB. (7)
It is easy to check that Pα(piv|zA) < Pα(piv|zB), so that the last inequality
cannot be satisﬁed if qArA = qBrB. It follows that if qArA = qBrB, there
cannot be an equilibrium of type (II). A similar argument holds with respect
to type (III). 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The ﬁrst part of the proof shows that n1/2xn goes






n (2qArA) = C0(n−1/2yn).








n (2qArA) = yn C
00(ξn) (8)













24(because 0 < yn < n1/2).
Now consider the case C0(0) = C00(0) = 0. Suppose that along some
subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite L ≥ 0. Then, along the subsequence
the right hand side of equation (8) converges to zero. However, the left-hand






(see e.g. Durrett 1991, Theorem 4.2, p. 94). Thus, if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, yn
diverges to +∞.
Consider the case C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = c < ∞. Suppose that along
some subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite L ≥ 0. Following the steps of
the previous case, we get that L must satisfy 2qArAπ−1/2 exp{−4L2} = Lc
or, equivalently, L = k. It remains to show that along no subsequence yn
diverges to +∞. To see this, note that the right-hand side of equation (8)
grows without bound if yn goes to inﬁnity, while for any positive , the left-
hand side is smaller than (π−1/2 + )(2qArA) for n large enough.
Finally, consider the case C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = ∞. If along some
subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite L > 0 or diverges to +∞, the right-
hand side of equation (8) grows without bound, while the left-hand side is
bounded by the argument above. Thus, if C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = ∞, yn
converges to 0.
The second part of the proof uses a probabilistic argument to establish
the desired result. Suppose the state is zA (similar calculations hold if the
state is zB). Given the equilibrium strategy described in Theorem 1(i), the
event of a given voter voting for A in state zA corresponds to a Bernoulli trial
with probability of success 1/2 + xn. For n = 1,2,... and i = 1,··· ,2n + 1





1/2 − xn if voter i votes for A,
−1/2 − xn if voter i votes for B.
For each n, the random variables V n
i are iid. Moreover,
E(V
n










3) = 1/8 − 2x
4
n.
25Let Fn stand for the distribution of the normalized sum
(V
n





i )2)(2n + 1).
Note that A loses the election if it obtains n or fewer votes, that is, if
V
n
1 + ··· + V
n




1 + ··· + V
n
2n+1 ≤ −1/2 − (2n + 1)xn.
Then, the probability of A winning the election is 1 − Fn(Jn), where
Jn =
−1/2 − (2n + 1)xn p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
.
Using the Berry-Esseen theorem (see Feller 1971, p. 542 or Durrett 1991, p.
106), for all w,







The right-hand side of the equation above converges to zero as n goes to
inﬁnity, so we obtain an increasingly good approximation using the normal
distribution even though the distribution of V n
i changes with n. Thus,
lim
n→∞|Fn(Jn) − Φ(Jn)| = 0.
If limn→∞ n1/2xn = k < ∞, then Jn converges to −2
√











If n1/2xn goes to inﬁnity with n, then Jn goes to −∞. Thus, for arbitrarily
large L, the probability of A winning the election is larger than 1 − Fn(−L)
for n large enough. Using the normal approximation above we can see that
the probability of A winning must go to one. 2
26Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the state is zA (similar calculations
hold if the state is zB). Using the notation of the proof of Theorem 2, the
number of votes for A is given by
V
n
1 + ··· + V
n
2n+1 + (2n + 1)(1/2 + xn).
Then, the winning margin is





i + (2n + 1)(1/2 + xn)

− (2n + 1)
2n + 1











Therefore, the probability that the winning margin is smaller or equal to κ
is equal to Fn(Dn) − Fn(In), where
Dn
(2n + 1)(κ/2 − xn)
p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
and
In
(2n + 1)(−κ/2 − xn)
p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
.
Note that Dn goes to +∞ and In goes to −∞ with n. Following the last
steps of the proof of Theorem 2, we have that the probability that the winning
margin is smaller or equal to κ must go to one. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. In the text for the case C00(0) ∈ (0,∞). Consider









n (2qArA) = n
1/2C
0(xn).
Recall that, using Stirling’s formula, (2n)!n1/2/(n!n!22n) → π−1/2. Also,
since in this case yn → 0, (1 − 4yn
2/n)
n → 1 (see e.g. Durrett 1991,
Theorem 4.2, p. 94). Thus, n1/2C0(xn) converges to 2qArAπ−1/2. Since
xnnC0(xn) = ynn1/2C0(xn), we get that xnnC0(xn) converges to zero. Using
27C(xn) ≤ xnC0(xn), we get that nC(xn) converges to zero. The statement of
the theorem follows.
Now consider the case C00(0) = 0. As in equation (8) in the proof of








n (2qArA) = xnnC
0(xn).
Since in this case yn → ∞, we claim that limn→∞ yn (1 − 4yn
2/n)
n = 0. To












The claim follows from yn exp(−4y2
n) → 0 and 16y5
n/n3 → 0 as n → ∞.
Recall that, using Stirling’s formula, (2n)!n1/2/(n!n!22n) → π−1/2. Thus,
xnnC0(xn) converges to zero. The statement of the theorem follows from
C(xn) ≤ xnC0(xn). 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Letting xo
n be the amount of information ac-











That is, the optimal amount of information is what the voters would acquire
if they internalize the gains of choosing the right alternative for the entire
society. Letting yo
n = n1/2xo















for some ξn between zero and n−1/2yo
n. Since the right-hand side of this
equation converges to zero, an argument similar to the ﬁrst part of the proof
of Theorem 2 establishes that yo
n → ∞. Thus, the probability of choosing the
right alternative converges to one along the sequence of optimal symmetric
proﬁles.




















28An argument similar to the proof of Theorem 3 shows that the left-hand side
converges to zero. Thus, xo
nnC0(xo




we get that nC(xo
n)/(2n + 1) → 0 which implies C(xo
n) → 0. 2
Existence of a Solution to (3.1)-(3.3). The system (3.1)-(3.2) is
equivalent to
(10.1) 2π−1/2 exp{−4(k0 + h0/2)2}qArA = k0c,










If, say, qArA > qBrB, this system has a solution satisfying h0 < 2k0 iﬀ
64(qBrB)
2/(πc
2) > ln((qArA)/(qBrB)), (11)
and the solution (if it exists) is unique. Thus, if qArA > qBrB, the inequality
(11) is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a solution to (3.1)-(3.3).
A similar condition is easily obtained if qArA < qBrB. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. We continue the argument from the proof of
Theorem 1. If qArA 6= qBrB, the inequality (5) cannot be satisﬁed for n
large enough since x∗ is positive but converges to zero as n goes to inﬁnity.
Thus, if qArA 6= qBrB there is no equilibrium of type (I) for large n. We
consider the case qArA > qBrB in the remainder of the proof, as the case
qArA < qBrB can be dealt with similarly. It is easy to check that there
cannot be an equilibrium of type (III) if qArA > qBrB because under any
informative strategy of type (III), Pα(piv|zA) > Pα(piv|zB). It remains to
ﬁnd out conditions under which there is an equilibrium of type (II) for large
n.










(1/4 − (x − δ(1/2 + x))2)n = ((1/2 − x)C0(x) + C(x))/(qBrB).
29(Note that the inequality in (7) is strictly satisﬁed if qArA > qBrB.) Let




4−n. (γ(n) is strictly decreasing in n and goes to
zero as n goes to inﬁnity.) Rewriting (12.1)-(12.2),
(13.1) γ(n)(1 − 4[(1 + H/2)x − Hx2]2)n = ((1/2 + x)C0(x) − C(x))/(qArA),
(13.2) γ(n)(1 − 4[(1 − H/2)x − Hx2]2)n = ((1/2 − x)C0(x) + C(x))/(qBrB).
The expressions in the RHS of (13.1) and (13.2) are strictly increasing
in x, while those in the LHS are decreasing in x for every H. It is easy to
check that for any given H ≥ 0 and for n large, there is a unique xI
n(H) and
a unique xII
n (H) solving respectively equations (13.1) and (13.2). Moreover,
xI
n(H) and xII




0(x) − C(x))/((1/2 − x)C
0(x) + C(x))
converges to one from above as x goes to zero. Thus, the RHS of (13.1) is
smaller than the RHS of (13.2) for x close to zero. Since the LHS of (13.1)
and (13.2) are equal for every x if H = 0, we get xI
n(0) > xII
n (0) for large n.
We claim ﬁrst that, under the conditions stated in part (i) of the theorem,
for every H > 0 there is some n such that xI(H) < xII(H) for n ≥ n. It
follows that there is a sequence of solutions to (12.1)-(12.2) (i.e. a sequence
of informative equilibria) such that along that sequence δ/x converges to
zero. To establish the claim it is suﬃcient to prove that for any H > 0, for
n large enough, the RHS is larger than the LHS of (13.1), evaluating them
at xII
n (H). That is,

1 − 4[(1 + H/2)x − Hx2]2





(1/2 + x)C0(x) − C(x)
(1/2 − x)C0(x) + C(x)
. (14)
where x = xII
n (H). Letting yn(H) = n1/2xII
n (H) and using the mean value
theorem, we get from (13.2)
γ(n)n





= yn(H)(1/2 − ξn)C
00(ξn)/(qBrB)
30for some ξn between zero and n−1/2yH
n . Following the steps of the ﬁrst part
of the proof of Theorem 2, we get yn(H) → ∞. Using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 in
Durrett (1991: p. 94), the LHS of (14) is approximately exp{−8H(yn(H))2}
for large n. Thus, it converges to 0. Since the RHS of (14) is bounded below
by (qArA)/(qBrB), (14) is satisﬁed for large n. This establishes the claim.
Now let ˆ xn and δn denote the information acquired by each voter and the
probability of playing the pure strategy (0,A,A) according to a sequence of
informative equilibria in case (i) of the theorem. Using (12.1) and following
the steps of the ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 2, we get ˆ xnn1/2 → ∞. A
minor variation on the second part of the proof of Theorem 2 establishes that
the probability of choosing the right alternative converges to one. Similarly,
a minor variation on the proof of Theorem 3 establishes that the aggregate
cost converges to zero.
Second, we claim that, under the conditions stated in part (ii) of the
theorem, xI
n(2) < xII
n (2) for large n, so that there is an equilibrium satisfying
x > δ/2. To see this, letting kII = limn→∞ yn(2) from (13.2) we get kII =
2π−1/2qBrB/c. Since, for H = 2, the LHS of (14) converges to exp{−16k2
II}
and the RHS is bounded below by (qArA)/(qBrB), (14) is satisﬁed for large
n if equation (11) is satisﬁed, that is, if (3.1)-(3.3) has a solution.
Now let ˆ xn and δn denote the information acquired by each voter and the
probability of playing the pure strategy (0,A,A) according to a sequence of
informative equilibria satisfying δn/ˆ xn < 2 in case (ii) of the theorem. Using
(12.1)-(12.2) and following the steps of the ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem
2, we get ˆ xnn1/2 → k0 and δnn1/2 → h0. Minor variations on the proofs of
Theorems 2 and 3 establish the statement about social welfare in part (ii) of
the theorem.
To prove part (iii) of the theorem, we proceed by contradiction. If
C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞) and there is a sequence {ˆ xn,δn} that solves (12.1)-(12.2)
for arbitrarily large n, then along that sequence we must get ˆ xnn1/2 → k00 and
δnn1/2 → h00, where k00,h00 solve (10.1)-(10.2). But this system is equivalent
to (3.1)-(3.2). Finally, if C00(0) = ∞, from (12.1) we get ˆ xnn1/2 → 0. But
using (12.1)-(12.2) we get
exp{−4((1 − δn)ˆ xnn1/2 + δnn1/2/2)2}





which is impossible unless qArA = qBrB. 2
31Proof of Theorem 5. It is straightforward to show that there is no
informative equilibrium for large n if C0(0) > 0. Assume C0(0) = 0. It is
easy to show that a best-responding voter will put probability zero to the set
of actions {(x,vA,vB) 6= (x,A,B) and x > 0}. Thus, if all other voters put
positive probability to the set of actions with x > 0, the probability that a
given voter is decisive, conditional on either state, will be positive. But then,
if C0(0) = 0, a best-responding voter will put probability zero to the actions
(0,A,B) and (0,B,A). The reason is that if the realization of ui is such
that the voter is indiﬀerent between (0,A,A) and (0,B,B), then it will pay
the voter to acquire some information. Thus, if C0(0) = 0, an informative
equilibrium mapping can put positive probability only on the actions (0,A,A)
and (0,B,B) and on the set {(x,A,B) : x > 0}. It is easy to check that an
informative equilibrium mapping must order the action (0,B,B) for ui < u
and (0,A,A) for ui > u for some pair u,u satisfying 0 < u < u < 1. We
claim that u = 1 − u. Suppose, e.g., u > 1 − u. Then the probability that
a voter is decisive in state zA would be larger than the probability the voter
is decisive in state zB. But then if the voter is indiﬀerent between acquiring
information or playing (0,A,A) if ui = u, then the voter should prefer to
acquire information if ui ∈ (1 − u, u). Since u = 1 − u, the probability
of being decisive in an informative equilibrium is the same in both states.
Denoting this probability Pσ(piv) we get that for ui ∈ (u,u), the information
quality chosen in equilibrium ˜ x must maximize
(1/2)Pσ(piv)(1/2 + x) − C(x).
(Note that the speciﬁc realization of ui drops from the objective function
because the probability of being decisive is the same in both states.) For a
voter to be indiﬀerent between acquiring information and playing (0,A,A)
if ui = u, it is necessary that
(u/2)Pσ(piv) = (1/2)Pσ(piv)(1/2 + ˜ x) − C(˜ x)
or equivalently,
u = 1/2 + ˜ x − 2C(˜ x)/Pσ(piv).











(1 − u + (u − u)(1/2 + ˜ x))






(1/4 − 4(˜ xn − C(˜ xn)/C0(˜ xn))2˜ x2
n)
n .
Equation (4) follows. It is simple to verify that (4) has a unique solution for
each n. 2
Proof of Theorem 6. Using Theorem 5, the probability that a voter
votes for the right alternative is equal to
1/2 + 2˜ xn(˜ xn − C(˜ xn)/C
0(˜ xn))
or
1/2 + 2˜ x
2
n(1 − C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC
0(˜ xn))).





1/2(1 − C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC
0(˜ xn))).
Let Q = 1−limx↓0 C(x)/(xC0(x)). Using L’Hˆ opital’s rule, it is easy to check
that Q ∈ [0,1] if C0(0) = 0, Q ∈ [1/2,1] if in addition C00(0) = 0, and
Q = 2/3 if in addition C000(0) = ˜ c ∈ (0,∞). Using equation (4) as in the
ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 2, we get ˜ x2
nn1/2 → 0 if C0(0) = 0 and
C00(0) > 0, or if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0 and C000(0) = ∞. Similarly, ˜ x2
nn1/2 →
∞ if C0(0) = C00(0) = C000(0) = 0. Finally, if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0 and
C000(0) = ˜ c ∈ (0,∞), from (4) we can get that the limit ˜ L of 2Q˜ x2
nn1/2 must
satisfy π−1/2 exp{−4˜ L2} = (3/4)˜ L˜ c, or equivalently ˜ L = ˜ k. The probability
of choosing the right alternative can be obtained following the steps of the
second part of the proof of Theorem 2.
With respect to the aggregate cost of information, suppose that C0(0) =
C00(0) = 0 and C000(0) = ˜ c ∈ (0,∞). Note that, using Theorem 5, the proba-
bility that a voter acquires information is given by 2˜ xn(1−C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC0(˜ xn))).
Thus, the expected aggregate cost in the limit is given by
lim








2(1 − C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC







1/2(1 − C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC
0(˜ xn))) → ˜ k and 1 − C(˜ xn)/(˜ xnC
0(˜ xn)) → 2/3
(from the previous paragraph) and
C(˜ xn)/˜ x
3
n → ˜ c/6,
(by L’Hˆ opital’s rule) we get that the expected aggregate cost converges to
˜ c˜ k2/4, as stated in the theorem. Other cases can be dealt with following the
steps of the proof of Theorem 3. 2
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